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City Sustainability Reporting: 
An Emerging & Desirable Legal Necessity 
ADAM J. SULKOWSKI 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Sustainability reporting—the practice of publishing data on 
environmental, societal, economic, and governance indicators—is 
standard among almost all major corporations. Ninety-three 
percent of the largest 250 corporations in the world (the Global 
Fortune 250, or G250) produce such reports along with over 4000 
other organizations.1  It is also known as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting, triple bottom line (TBL) reporting, 
corporate responsibility (CR) reporting, citizenship reporting, and 
environmental, societal, and governance (ESG) reporting. This 
practice is now beginning to spread in the public sector. From 
small municipalities to large metropolises, city governments have 
started to collect and publish data on non-financial measures of 
performance. 
 This article will begin with a brief history of sustainability 
reporting, including recent developments related to its adoption 
by cities. The author will then review two major trends that, 
considered together, indicate sustainability reporting should be 
viewed as an emerging legal necessity for municipalities in the 
United States. First, the exemption shielding cities from the 
disclosure requirements of securities laws has eroded. Second, 
 
 Associate Professor of Law & Sustainability, Babson College. 
 1. KPMG, THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 
2013, at 4, 11 (Dec. 2013), http://www.globalsustain.org/files/kpmg_corporate-
responsibility-reporting-survey-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMP5-B7QF] 
[hereinafter KPMG SURVEY 2013]. 
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sustainability disclosures now fit the definition of what must—as 
a matter of materiality, if not specific mandates—be reported to 
investors. This means that the cities that have collectively issued 
over $3.67 trillion in securities2 should all be disclosing 
sustainability data. The author concludes that this emerging 
legal requirement is in the interest of all stakeholders and is 
pragmatic public policy. 
II. SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: HOW IT BECAME 
DE RIGUEUR FOR COMPANIES 
 The 1929 stock market collapse highlighted the risks of 
market failure because of lack of information.3  It crystallized 
acceptance of a view that both investors and the rest of society 
would benefit if publicly traded companies issued regular 
financial disclosures under the auspices of government 
enforcement.4  This led to the passage of the Securities Acts of 
1933 and 1934 (hereinafter Securities Acts) and the creation of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).5 
 In 1984, the release of deadly chemical gas from a factory in 
Bhopal, India, catalyzed awareness that public disclosure of 
hazardous chemical stockpiles could mitigate the risk of similar 
calamities in the future.6  The accident was among the factors 
that led to passage of the Emergency Planning and Community 
 
 2. See Statistics, SIFMA: INVESTED IN AMERICA, http://www.sifma.org/ 
research/statistics.aspx [http://perma.cc/NMX9-FZQH] (last updated Nov. 5, 
2015). This represents over 9.2 percent of the total bond market in the United 
States. Id. 
 3. Allen L. White, Why We Need Global Standards for Corporate Disclosure, 
69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 175–76 (2006). 
 4. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 409 (1990). 
 5. David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual 
Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to 
Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 145 
(2007). 
 6. Peter H. Sand, The Right to Know: Freedom of Environmental 
Information in Comparative and International Law, 20 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
203, 209 (2011). Sand also provides a fascinating history of how post-9/11 
counterterrorism concerns were used to restrict public access to environmental 
data about companies gathered by government institutions during the years 
2001–2009, though this trend was somewhat reversed in 2009. Id. at 221–26. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/4
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Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986,7 which, rather than 
controlling behavior, only requires publication of emergency 
response plans and the disclosure of stockpiles of specified 
dangerous chemicals through the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).8  
This simple requirement—measurement and public reporting of 
hazardous chemical stockpiles—led to dramatic reductions in the 
amount of dangerous chemicals kept near communities; a third 
generation of environmental law, known as informational 
regulation or regulation-by-disclosure, was born.9 
 Since then, corporate leaders have accepted that disclosure 
of a broad set of measures of social, environmental, and economic 
impacts and information on governance serve to benefit 
companies and their stakeholders.10  By the second decade of the 
new millennium, a trend was afoot to merge such disclosures with 
conventional financial reporting—a practice dubbed integrated 
reporting—with the hope that such a linkage will help managers, 
investors, and stakeholders see the synergy between “doing good” 
and “doing well.”11 
 Between 2005 and 2013, according to KPMG’s triennial 
study of the phenomenon, the share of the G250 engaging in 
sustainability reporting grew from sixty-four to ninty-three 
 
 7. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50 (2012). 
 8. See id. §§ 11003, 11022–23. 
 9. David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational 
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 384 
(2005). 
 10. See, e.g., EY & BOS. COLLEGE CTR. FOR CORP. CITIZENSHIP, VALUE OF 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2 (2014), http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/EY_-_Value_of_sustainability_reporting/$FILE/EY-Value-of-
Sustainability-Reporting.pdf  [http://perma.cc/S6AF-33LH] (discussing the value 
of sustainability reporting and why many businesses practice it); see also Glob. 
Reporting Initiative, Report or Explain: A Smart EU Policy Approach to Non-
financial Information Disclosure, at 3 (May 2013), https:// 
www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-non-paper-Report-or-Explain.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AM7A-E6A9] (discussing motivations for sustainability 
reporting). See generally JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE 
BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1998) (considering whether holding 
corporations accountable to a “triple bottom-line” of economic prosperity, 
environmental quality, and social justice constitutes progress). 
 11. See ROBERT G. ECCLES & MICHAEL KRZUS, ONE REPORT: INTEGRATED 
REPORTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY ix (2010). 
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percent.12  Of 4100 companies representing the largest 100 
companies in forty-one countries (the global N100), seventy-one 
percent report corporate responsibility data.13  These facts led 
KPMG to assert that such reporting had come of age and become 
“de facto law for business.”14 
 The dominant standard for ESG or CR disclosures was 
developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); eighty-two 
percent of reporting entities among the G250 referred to the GRI 
guidelines in 2013, as did over seventy-eight percent of the 
N100.15  The GRI, a multi-stakeholder network of experts, began 
as a project of two U.S. non-profit organizations, CERES and 
Tellus, in the 1990s.16  It expanded under the auspices of the 
United Nations (UN) and in 2002 became an independent non-
profit organization based in Amsterdam.17  The GRI guidelines 
are intended as a framework for not only reporting but also 
engaging with external stakeholder groups.18  “Since 2010, the 
UN Global Compact (UNGC) Secretariat has strongly 
recommended that the more than 10,000 (as of early 2013) 
signatories of the UNGC (many of them large corporations) use 
the GRI’s reporting framework in their annually required 
Communications on Progress.”19 
 
 12. KPMG SURVEY 2013, supra note 1, at 11. The number of companies in the 
G250 who engaged in sustainability reporting (either in a stand-alone or annual 
financial report) grew from sixty-four percent in 2005 to eighty-three percent in 
2008 and has stayed over 90 percent since 2011. KPMG, KPMG INTERNATIONAL 
SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2011, at 21 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/corporate
-responsibility/pages/2011-survey.aspx [http://perma.cc/34CD-BTTD] 
[hereinafter KPMG SURVEY 2011]; KPMG, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008, at 15, http://www.kpmg.com/EU/en/ 
Documents/KPMG_International_survey_Corporate_responsibility_Survey_Rep
orting_2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/2M9M-YQY2] [hereinafter KPMG SURVEY 
2008]; KPMG, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
REPORTING 2005, at 4 [hereinafter KPMG SURVEY 2005]. 
 13. KPMG SURVEY 2013, supra note 1, at 11. 
 14. KPMG SURVEY 2011, supra note 12, at 2. 
 15. KPMG SURVEY 2013, supra note 1, at 31. 
 16. K. MILES HILL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 10 YEARS ON (2007). 
 17. Id. at 2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Adam Sulkowski & Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting: 
Integrated Reporting is Practiced, Required and More Would Be Better, 10 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 1060, 1064 (2014) (citing GRI and UN Global Compact Forge New 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/4
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 Integrated reporting—the term for blending sustainability-
related data into regular financial disclosures—has grown 
rapidly. In 2008, less than ten percent of the N100 had adopted 
this practice; by 2011, this proportion had grown to twenty 
percent, and, by 2013, fifty-one percent included sustainability 
disclosures in their financial reports.20 
Integrated reporting is promoted by the International Integrated 
Reporting Committee (IIRC), which defines it as “a concise 
communication about how an organization’s strategy, 
governance, performance and prospects lead to the creation of 
value over the short, medium, and long term.”  The IIRC is a 
global coalition of major accounting firms, the GRI, financial and 
investment institutions, major corporations, business and 
accounting associations, academics, U.N. agencies, and other 
interested parties. Collectively, its members agree that numerous 
elements [of performance] beyond the scope of conventional 
financial statements, such as people, natural resources, 
intellectual capital, market and regulatory control, competition, 
and energy security help determine an organization’s value, and 
need to be clearly communicated to stakeholders. . . . [M]ore than 
eighty global businesses (including companies like Coca-Cola, 
Microsoft, Unilever, and Marks and Spencer) and fifty 
institutional investors, in addition to major accounting entities 
and their associations, are involved in developing the integrated 
reporting framework, [which] suggests [the] long-term viability 
[of the movement].21 
 The regular KPMG surveys of executives accountable for 
sustainability reporting is the best source of systematically 
gathered data on what is motivating the practice.22  While the 
most commonly identified motivations have varied depending on 
the year of the study and sampling of companies, executives have 
identified several common drivers of reporting, including 
maintaining a reputation or brand, stimulating innovation and 
 
Alliance, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT (June 24, 2010), http:// 
www.unglobalcompact.org/news/50-06-24-2010 [http://perma.cc/L99N-FVUU]). 
 20. KPMG SURVEY 2013, supra note 1, at 28. 
 21. Sulkowski & Waddock, supra note 19, at 1064–65 (footnotes omitted). 
 22. KPMG SURVEY 2013, supra note 1; KMG SURVEY 2011, supra note 12; 
KPMG SURVEY 2008, supra note 12; KPMG SURVEY 2005, supra note 12. 
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learning, employee motivation, and relations with shareholders.23  
Other experts and academics believe that increased disclosure 
should foster greater transparency, provide incentives for cleaner 
technologies,24 and facilitate dialogue concerning the effects of 
climate change and other significant risks in the business 
world.25  The growth in sustainability reporting can also be 
attributed to pressure from investors, consumers, and activists.26 
III.  CITIES PUBLISHING SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTS—AN EMERGING TREND 
 As of 2003, there were already dozens of proposed formats 
for reporting sustainability data.27  However, at a time that 1054 
cities had signed the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate 
Protection Agreement, committing them to reduce carbon 
emissions below 1990 levels by 2012, only ten percent had 
developed concrete plans for meeting this goal and only a few 
 
 23. KPMG SURVEY 2013, supra note 1, at 44. 
 24. See Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under the 
Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for 
Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093, 1124–29, 1144 (1993) 
(illustrating that environmental disclosure can foster environmental protection 
by creating an incentive to solve environmental problems to preserve the market 
value of securities). 
 25. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, 
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
129, 202–03 (2005) (explaining how, in the context of information security, 
mandated disclosures increase awareness of problems and supports systemic 
adoption of best practices for both corporations and consumers). See generally 
Adam J. Sulkowski, Cyber-Extortion: Duties and Liabilities Related to the 
Elephant in the Server Room, 21 U. ILL. J. L., TECH. & POL'Y 22 (2007) 
(explaining how cybersecurity breaches, inadequate preventative measures, and 
related costs and liabilities are more routine than commonly realized, and are 
under-reported to all stakeholders). 
 26. See generally Adam J. Sulkowski et al., Corporate Responsibility 
Reporting in China, India, Japan, and the West: One Mantra Does Not Fit All, 
42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 787 (2008) (explaining that cultural values could color how 
managers even discussed their motivations, with Western executives being more 
inclined to openly state that they engage in sustainability reporting for the sake 
of their shareholders); Sandra Waddock, Building a New Institutional 
Infrastructure for Corporate Responsibility, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP.  87 (2008). 
 27. See generally Thomas M. Parris & Robert W. Kates, Characterizing and 
Measuring Sustainable Development, 28 ANN. REV. OF ENV’T & RESOURCES 559 
(2003). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/4
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dozen tracked progress, much less published regular reports, 
citing a lack of staff or data, or fear of failure.28 
 There are two global associations of cities that are playing 
key roles in promoting inventories of carbon emissions: C40 Cities 
(which acquired its moniker when its membership consisted of 
forty cities)29 and ICLEI (founded in 1990 as the International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives and now known as 
Local Governments for Sustainability, even though the group 
retains the ICLEI acronym).30  Both efforts are focused on carbon 
and carbon-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions, but these 
statistics reflect many aspects of city operations, including waste 
management, transportation infrastructure, building codes, 
protected green spaces, and citizen behavior, among other things. 
 STARS Communities is a more comprehensive reporting 
and rating framework specifically designed for cities in the 
United States; major backers include several municipalities, the 
National League of Cities, federal agencies, plus corporations 
such as Siemens and foundations such as the Home Depot 
Foundation.31  As of 2016, 108 communities in the United States 
and Canada were listed on their website as having some level of 
involvement or adoption, ranging from the town of Nederland, 
Colorado (population 1446) to Toronto (population 2,600,000).32 
 GRI standards have been in some way referenced and listed 
in GRI’s database of reports a total of 252 times by a variety 
public sector entities since 2004.33  The oldest continuously 
reporting municipal entity is Redland City Council, Australia, 
which was the only public sector entity to publish and list a 
report in 2004.34  Some cities in various countries outside of the 
United States produced a report once or twice but apparently 
 
 28. See SADHU AUFOCHS JOHNSTON ET AL., THE GUIDE TO GREENING CITIES 189 
(Island Press, 2013). 
 29. C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org [http://perma.cc/732L-Z8J5]. 
 30. ICLEI; LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY,  http://www.iclei.org 
[http://perma.cc/3JDB-ZDBC]. 
 31. Sponsorship, STAR COMMUNITIES, http://www.starcommunities.org/about/ 
sponsors/ [http://perma.cc/PZD2-W6FN]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, www.globalreporting.org 
[http://perma.cc/3GCH-9Q3C]. 
 34. See id. 
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discontinued.35  The Town of Dartmouth and City of Fall River, 
both in Massachusetts, had the distinction of being the first 
municipalities in the United States to adopt a GRI standard in 
late 2012.36  In 2013, Warsaw, the capital of Poland, became the 
first entity, public or private, to adopt the latest standard from 
GRI, the G4.37  All together sixty-seven public sector entities 
referenced the GRI standard for their sustainability reporting in 
2013, with eleven being published and listed in the name of an 
entire city.38 
Most recently, the International Standards Organization 
(ISO) has published its guidelines for city sustainability 
reporting.39  The ISO standard is based on several years of 
coordination between cities of various sizes, locations, and phases 
of development.40  Its 100 indicators may be the best set of 
universal “vital signs” of governance, sustainability, and quality 
of life tailored for municipalities to date.41  Roughly twenty cities 
are officially committed to piloting the standard, coordinating and 
sharing information through the World Council on City Data, 
with other cities taking note and to some extent embracing the 
themes and disclosure of specific indicators, if they have not 
already been publishing them.42 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. Conversation with Mike Wallace, Head of GRI Focal Point USA 
(December 5, 2012). 
 37. Conversation with Mike Wallace, Head of GRI Focal Point USA (August 
1, 2013). 
 38. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 33. 
 39. Int’l Standards Org., Sustainable Development of Communities – 
Indicators for City Services and Quality of Life, ISO 37120:2014 (2014), 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:37120:ed-1:v1:en [https://perma.cc/J9K8-
MM83]. 
 40. GLOBAL CITY INDICATORS, http://www.cityindicators.org [http://perma.cc/ 
N4PU-E677]. 
 41. See Int’l Standards Org., supra note 39. 
 42. World Council on City Data, The WCCD and ISO 37120: Created by 
Cities, for Cities (2014), http://www.cityindicators.org/Deliverables/ 
WCCD%20Brochure_9-16-2014-178620.pdf [http://perma.cc/DBQ4-QUWJ]; 
Global City Registry for ISO 37120, WORLD COUNCIL ON CITY DATA, 
http://www.dataforcities.org/registry [http://perma.cc/JBP7-A2E3]. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/4
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IV.  CITY SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: WHY IT IS 
EMERGING AS A LEGAL NECESSITY 
 Before commencing a discussion of the legal obligations of 
cities under securities laws, it is useful to begin by clarifying 
what is the meaning of the word “city” in the context of this 
paper. Cities legally are imagined in two ways as a matter of 
legal theory—either effectively subordinates of a national or sub-
national government, or else as sovereigns manifesting the will of 
a local polity.43  Some scholars emphasize the differences in the 
precise meanings of the terms “locality,” “local government,” and 
“local authority.”44  Consistent with other authors who have 
written on the topic of cities and sustainable development, the 
term “city” will be used loosely here, the significance being that 
the discussion below could apply to entities that are technically 
towns or some other form of locality or local government entity.45 
 This section will now review the erosion of the disclosure 
exemptions for municipal securities, as discussed in articles by 
Christine Sgarlata Chung,46 Theresa A. Gabaldon,47 and Lisa 
Anne Hamilton,48 and add the observation that sustainability 
disclosures fit the definition of materiality. Municipalities in the 
United States were historically exempted from having to comply 
with most of the scheme of federal mandatory reporting rules 
when issuing securities, but have increasingly fallen under the 
same disclosure paradigm applicable to businesses.49  This 
development is key to appreciating why the legal environment of 
 
 43. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 
1062, 1067 (1980). 
 44. See Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
875, 880 (2006). 
 45. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 43, at 1061–62. 
 46. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and 
Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and 
Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1501–02 (2013). 
 47. Lisa Anne Hamilton, Canary in the Coal Mine: Can the Campaign for 
Mandatory Climate Risk Disclosure Withstand the Municipal Bond Market’s 
Resistance to Regulatory Reform?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1014, 1016 (2010). 
 48. Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of 
Municipal Securities Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 739, 769 (2009). 
 49. See Hamilton, supra note 47, at 1017–32 (overviewing the municipal bond 
market and obligations of issuers, brokers, dealers, and underwriters, as well as 
discussing the climate risk disclosure debate). 
9
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municipal financing has fundamentally changed, and why a 
parallel evolution of disclosure practices in the private sector is 
now relevant to cities. 
The Securities Act of 1933 specifically exempted municipal 
securities issuers and their securities from the registration, 
disclosure, and periodic reporting requirements applicable to 
corporations.50  The predominant reason for this exemption 
appears to have been the power of the local government and Wall 
Street lobbies.51  However, other key factors included “concerns 
about the cost[s] of a more robust regulatory regime, perceptions 
regarding the financial expertise of the institutional investors 
who then dominated the ranks of purchasers, . . . the lack of 
perceived abuses as compared to other market segments,” and the 
principle of comity.52  For almost half a century the distribution 
of municipal securities remained practically unregulated.53 
 Congress only acted to regulate municipality-issued 
securities in 1975, after New York City almost defaulted on $600 
billion of bonds.54  It did so by creating the Municipal Securities 
Rating Board (MSRB) which establishes rules for those involved 
in the underwriting, trading, and selling of municipal 
securities.55  However, it was not until 1989, after two more 
crises, that disclosures to investors were addressed. First, the 
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) defaulted on 
$2.25 billion of revenue bonds issued to fund the construction of 
 
 50. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22 § 3(a)(2), 48 Stat. 74, 76 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(2) (2006)). 
 51. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 187 (3d ed. 
2003). 
 52. Chung, supra note 46, at 1501. 
 53. Municipalities did not fall under the definition of “person” for purposes of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act and therefore Regulation 10(b)5—an omission 
only corrected in 1975. An Act Amending the Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. 
No. 94-29, §3, 89 Stat. 97, 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(9) (2006)). 
 54. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, NEW YORK CITY'S FISCAL PROBLEM: 
IT'S ORIGINS, POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS, AND SOME ALTERNATIVE POLICY 
RESPONSES (1975). 
 55. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §13, 89 Stat. 97, 
132 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (1976)). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/4
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nuclear power plants.56  Neither Congress nor the Commission 
imposed disclosure obligations upon municipal securities issuers 
in the wake of the WPPSS default; instead, the SEC, using its 
authority to deter fraud and manipulation, adopted Rule 15c2-
12.57  Rule 15c2-12 requires underwriters to obtain, review, and 
distribute to investors copies of municipalities’ official statements 
before primary offerings.58  In its accompanying statement, the 
Commission underscored the obligation to review the issuer’s 
official statement as part of due diligence obligations.59 
Post-offering disclosures by municipalities remained non-
mandatory until 1994, just before the bankruptcy and near-
default of Orange County in California that had accompanied its 
venture into derivatives.60  Through amendments to Rule 15c2-
12, the Commission prohibited underwriters from participating in 
a municipal offering unless the underwriter reasonably 
determined that the issuer (or an obligated person) had agreed to 
provide specified annual information and notices of certain events 
to then-existing information repositories.61  Amendments also 
banned the recommendation of the purchase or sale of municipal 
securities without procedures for the receipt of any related event 
notices.62  In 2008, the SEC further amended Rule 15c2-12 to 
require confirmation that issuing municipalities have agreed to 
provide disclosures to the MSRB through a system now known as 
EMMA (Electronic Municipal Market Access).63 
 In June 2010, given ongoing concerns over the quality of 
disclosures, the Commission further adapted Rule 15c-12 to 
 
 56. DIV. OF ENF'T, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION IN THE MATTER OF TRANSACTIONS IN WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER 
SUPPLY SYSTEM SECURITIES 1 (1988). 
 57. The Commission adopted rule 15c2-12 under section 15(c)(2) of the 1934 
Act. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (June 28, 1989) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 241). 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2015); see Municipal Securities Disclosure, 54 
Fed. Reg. 28,799. 
 59. See generally Municipal Securities Disclosure, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778 (Sept. 
22, 1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing Rule 15c2-12). 
 60. See Ann Judith Gellis, Municipal Securities Market: Same Problems—No 
Solutions, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 427, 454 (1996). 
 61. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,759, 12,759 (March 9, 
1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(c). 
 63. Id. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i). 
11
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require that broker-dealers and municipal securities dealers 
provide additional disclosure about certain events,64 made such 
reports mandatory,65 expanded the number and type of 
reportable events,66 and imposed time limits for reporting 
events.67  The amendments effectively mandated disclosure 
requirements for municipal securities.68  Simultaneously the 
Commission issued interpretive guidance emphasizing the 
applicability of antifraud provisions in the context of expanded 
reporting expectations for cities, especially in cases where there is 
a lack of continuing disclosure documents.69 
It is important to note the applicability of Rule 10b-5.70  Rule 
10b-5 is significant for establishing liability for fraud—not just 
for misstatements but also for omissions, both in required and 
voluntary disclosures.71  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated that municipal securities are subject to Rule 10b-5.72  The 
significance of Rule 10b-5 being applicable is further explained 
below, as it is one basis for believing that sustainability-related 
disclosures should be seen as legally mandated. To summarize 
this section so far: the past three decades have seen an 
acceleration of the trend of treating municipalities in a manner 
 
 64. Id. § 240.15c2-12(c); see Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, 
75 Fed. Reg. 33,100 (June 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 241). 
 65. See Amendment to Municipal Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 33,100. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 17 C.F.R. §240.15c2-12(d)(5). 
 68. Chung, supra note 46, at 1506 & n.250 (citing 17 C.F.R. §240.15c2-
12(d)(5)). 
 69. Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 33,101, 
33,123. 
 70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) 
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 71. See Rachel Cherington, Securities Laws and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Toward an Expanded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. 
L. 1439, 1448 (2004). 
 72. SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 858 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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similar to that of other issuers of securities, to the point that one 
author opined that “functional differences between municipal and 
nonmunicipal securities regulation may and should be coming to 
an end.”73 
Now that the exemption of municipalities from securities 
laws has eroded, the question naturally arises: has sustainability 
reporting meanwhile evolved into a legal necessity in securities 
markets? The remainder of this section will proceed by reviewing 
explicit legal requirements to disclose sustainability-related 
information. It will then move on to discuss the significance of the 
materiality principle and investors’ demands for such data, 
finding a general mandate for all securities issuers to disclose 
sustainability-related information. 
In addition to financial statements,74 the regulations 
required by the Securities Acts also mandate that companies 
publish non-financial information, including data related to 
market conditions,75 litigation,76 and trends and events likely to 
affect financial results.77  Since 1971, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has required the filing of 
environmental information as part of mandatory annual reports 
under Form 10-K.78  Relevant guidance includes: 
Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material 
effects that compliance with Federal, State and local provisions 
which have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of 
materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the 
protection of the environment, may have upon the capital 
 
 73. Gabaldon, supra note 48, at 740. 
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 229.301. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. § 229.103. 
 77. Id. § 229.303(a)(1). 
 78. See RESEARCHING THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS THROUGH THE SEC 
WEBSITE, www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/securitieslaws.htm [http://perma.cc/BR4C-
MCM6 ] (Latest in SEC guidance on disclosure issues); see also MARK MANSLEY, 
OPEN DISCLOSURE: SUSTAINABILITY AND THE LISTING REGIME 34 (2003); ROBERT 
REPETTO ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE SECURITIES 
REGULATIONS AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS OF CANADA, MEXICO AND 
THE UNITED STATES 4 (2002); Robert H. Feller, Environmental Disclosure and the 
Securities Laws, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 225, 225–39 (1995); Elizabeth Anne 
Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by Public 
Companies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 130 
(1992); Wallace, supra note 24, at 1093. 
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expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant 
and its subsidiaries.79 
 Disclosures are further mandated by the SEC in the 
context related to human rights: companies must publish 
whether they are active in operations against which the United 
States has imposed sanctions.80  Furthermore, “other provisions, 
by requiring mention of managerial training related to legal 
standards, by extension require the mention of foreign minimum 
mandated disclosures.”81  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter the Dodd-Frank Act) 
mandates specific sustainability-related disclosures82 and 
requires that the SEC collect and publish them online.83  These 
include audited reports on minerals sourced from conflict zones,84 
tracking of mining safety standard violations,85 and payments to 
governments related to oil and gas extraction rights.86  On 
 
 79. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii). See generally Michael A. Meloy, Disclosure 
of Environmental Liability in SEC Filings, Financial Statements, and Debt 
Instruments: An Introduction, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 315 (1994); Gerard A. Caron, 
Comment, SEC Disclosure Requirements for Contingent Environmental 
Liability, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 729 (1987). 
 80. Eric Engle, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Human Rights, 
Shareholder Activism, and SEC Reporting Requirements, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
63, 84 n.135 (2006) (citing SEC Scrutinizing Foreign Registrants Regarding 
Dealings in Countries Under U.S. Sanctions, Prac. L. Inst. Order No. F0-00AN, 
at 81 (Dec. 2001)). 
 81. Sulkowski & Waddock, supra note 19, at 1068. 
 82. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111–203, § 1504(q)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2220–21 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-
Frank Act]. See generally David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized 
Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 
6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327 (2011) (providing an overview and discussion of the 
Act); Emily Veale, Note, Is There Blood On Your Hands-Free Device?: Examining 
Legislative Approaches to the Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503 (2013). 
 83. Dodd-Frank Act § 1504(q)(3) (“To the extent practicable, the Commission 
shall make available online, to the public, a compilation of the information 
required to be submitted under the rules issued under paragraph (2)(A).”). 
 84. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/UQ33-GWNX]; see also Dodd-Frank Act § 1502 (discussing 
conflict minerals). 
 85. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, supra note 84; see also Dodd-Frank Act 
§ 1503 (“Reporting Requirements Regarding Coal or Other Mine Safety”). 
 86. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, supra note 84; see also Dodd-Frank Act 
§ 1504 (“Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers”). 
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January 27, 2010, the SEC provided public companies with 
interpretive guidance for climate change related disclosure 
requirements.87  It clarified that businesses should disclose to 
investors any serious risks due to climate change or related 
policies, regulations, legislation, international accords, or 
business trends.88  Some assert that explicit SEC guidelines have 
already improved transparency in this area (and comparability of 
performance between firms), with regard to corporate greenhouse 
gas emissions.89  Existing rules have mandated reporting on the 
“reasonably likely” material costs of complying with 
environmental statutes and regulations.90  Interpretive guidance 
does not add new requirements, but rather clarifies 
expectations.91  Only one commissioner objected to this 
clarification, arguing that climate risks are beyond the expertise 
of the SEC.92 
 The materiality principle, correctly understood from both a 
historical and contemporary perspective, further compels publicly 
 
 87. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Interpretive 
Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments Regarding 
Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm [ 
http://perma.cc/HE47-WBVP]. 
 88. Nickolas M. Boecher, SEC Interpretive Guidance for Climate-Related 
Disclosures, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 43, 43 (2010); Mary Schapiro, SEC 
Chairperson, Statement Before the Open Comm’n Meeting on Disclosure 
Related to Business or Legislative Events on the Issue of Climate Change (Jan. 
27, 2010) [hereinafter Schapiro, Statement Before Open Comm’n]; see Jeffrey A. 
Smith et al., The SEC's Interpretive Release on Climate Change Disclosure, 4 
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 147, 147–48 (2010); see also Camden D. Burton, 
Recent Development, An Inconvenient Risk: Climate Change Disclosure and the 
Burden on Corporations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1287, 1288–89 (2010). 
 89. See Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Disclosure, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 281–82 (2009); see also Perry E. Wallace, 
Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are Things Heating 
Up in the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 293–99 (2008); Elizabeth E. 
Hancock, Note, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain: Corporate Risk of 
Liability for Global Climate Change and the SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 233–35 (2005). 
 90. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 
75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6294 (Feb. 8, 2010), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-02-
08/pdf/2010-2602.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3JG-W6VY]. The four areas in which 
climate change may result in disclosure obligations: Legislation and Regulation; 
International Accords; Indirect Consequences of Regulation or Business Trends; 
and Physical Impacts of Climate Change. Id. 
 91. Schapiro, Statement Before Open Comm’n, supra note 88. 
 92. Boecher, supra note 88, at 43. 
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traded companies to disclose information related to 
sustainability. The SEC defines materiality as information 
related to “those matters about which an average prudent 
investor ought reasonably to be informed.”93  This is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, in which the Court stated that the materiality 
requirement is satisfied when there is “a substantial likelihood 
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total 
mix’ of information made available.”94  The standard of 
“reasonableness” is the focus of an inquiry by Steven Lydenberg, 
who points out that, in the context of torts, a reasonable person 
is—by long-standing tradition—defined as minimizing risks of 
harm, and that a reasonable investor has these same concerns.95  
The key point with respect to investors, however, is that unless 
the relevant information is available to them, they are unable to 
make a reasonable assessment of their investments. In addition 
to academics and the SEC, practitioners have also gone on record 
to state that environmental risks are material.96 
 Rule 10b-5 is critically relevant, especially when considered 
in tandem with the materiality principle’s disclosure mandate.97  
 
 93. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1-02(o) (2015) (defining “material”). 
 94. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
 95. STEVEN LYDENBERG, HAUSER CTR. FOR NONPROFIT ORGS., ON MATERIALITY 
AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE VALUE OF DISCLOSURE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 13 
(2012), http://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/On-Materiality-and-
Sustainability.pdf [http://perma.cc/XQN8-STG8]. 
 96. Engle, supra note 80, at 91 n.160 (citing Letter from Honorable John B. 
Stephenson, Ranking Minority Member, Comm. on Env’t & Public Works, to 
Senator Jon S. Corzine (D.-N.J.) (July 14, 2004), reprinted in U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD 
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 1 
(2004) (“Environmental risks and liabilities are among the conditions that, if 
undisclosed, could impair the public’s ability to make sound investment 
decisions. For example, the discovery of extensive hazardous waste 
contamination . . . [or] impending environmental regulations could affect a 
company's future financial position.”)). 
 97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,(b) [t]o make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
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As succinctly summarized by Rachel Cherington, “[b]ecause Rule 
10b-5 requires veracity in corporate statements, even when there 
is no affirmative duty to disclose such information, the rule 
reaches a broader cross-section of corporate statements than 
those required in the periodic and annual statements.”98  
Misstatements or major omissions, even with regard to 
information that is voluntarily proffered, can potentially amount 
to a fraud upon investors.99  
 
  To date, several scholars have specifically identified climate 
change as a context where related corporate disclosures are 
clearly required. 
Perry Wallace has argued that, given the likely catastrophic 
consequences of climate change and existing fiduciary duties of 
managers, companies should, given existing rules and principles, 
[be making] greater non-financial disclosures. This line of 
reasoning, agreed upon by David Monsma and Timothy Olson, 
holds that company responses to climate change are material 
knowledge to investors and that regulation S-K, correctly 
interpreted, requires related disclosures. Jeffrey McFarland 
agrees with this logic, stating that U.S. securities laws should be 
interpreted as requiring at least a disclosure of liability exposure, 
including amounts of emissions and actions taken to reduce the 
risk of related possible losses. As further evidence that U.S. 
securities laws. . . [already] require extensive reporting on the 
side effects of doing business, some point to instances where 
disclosures in the U.S. were greater than in countries that have 
explicitly stipulated what must be reported to such an extent 
that some think that. . . U.S. [materiality] standards [and their 
encouragement of disclosure]s are even worthy of emulation. 
 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) 
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. Id. 
 98. Cherington, supra note 71, at 1448. 
 99. This strong possibility—at least in theory—of eventually being accused of 
defrauding investors for withholding or misrepresenting data on ESG and 
sustainability performance stands in strong contraposition to an apparent lack 
of consequences (to date) for constructing LEED-certified buildings that may not 
actually perform as expected. Adam J. Sulkowski, LEEDigation: The Risks, Why 
We Don’t See More, and Practical Guidance Related to Green Building Contracts, 
39 REAL EST. L.J. 192, 195–96 (2010). 
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. . . . 
Perhaps most persuasively, the argument that the materiality 
principle [and Rule 10b-5] behoove[] greater ESG reporting is 
supported by the amount of demand for such disclosures by 
investors.100 
If materiality ultimately is a question of what reasonable 
investors would want to know, there is no better proof that 
sustainability meets this minimum standard than large numbers 
of investors explicitly stating this demand. 
Seven hundred twenty-two investors controlling $87 trillion in 
assets have expressed a desire through the Carbon Disclosure 
Project for greater climate-related disclosure, and the amount of 
investments represented continues to grow. . . 
 Over 1,000 financial firms with assets under management of 
approximately $33 trillion had signed on to the U.N.’s six 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) as of 2012. Among 
other things, the signatories committed to incorporate 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues into their 
investment analyses and decision making, be active owners 
around these issues, seek appropriate ESG disclosure by 
companies in which they invest, and collaborate to promulgate 
the PRI broadly, while reporting on their own activities. 
Twelve percent of managed assets are invested in stocks that are 
currently screened based on ethical criteria. The U.S. SIF (Social 
Investment Forum) reported in its 2012 Trends Report that some 
$3.74 trillion is now under the responsible investment umbrella, 
with $3.3 trillion (out of a total of $33.3 trillion total investment) 
incorporating ESG data. The investors and fund managers 
associated with these funds, and with the PRI, are now at least 
in theory making investment decisions partially based on non-
financial but potentially material disclosures, and firms [are] 
responding to this market demand for more information. Such 
investors are becoming more vocal—of 600 shareholder 
resolutions being tracked by Ernst & Young in 2013, 44 percent 
related to environmental and societal issues. 
 One measure that investors are taking ESG disclosures 
seriously is that a large and growing share of G250 companies 
goes further than. . . measuring and publishing such data. 
Almost half pay for third-party verification, with a majority of 
 
 100. Sulkowski & Waddock, supra note 19, at 1071–72 (footnotes omitted). 
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these engaging one of the major international accountancy firms. 
One-third of the G250 [have] issued restatements regarding their 
ESG data, indicating that they perceived a critical mass of 
stakeholders––including shareholders––follow and actually pay 
attention to the veracity and reliability of this information. 
Another indicator that companies realize there is a demand for 
this data is the widespread drive to make it more accessible 
across multiple communications media; only 20 percent 
communicate their sustainability data solely through stand-alone 
sustainability reports. 
 Forty-seven percent of the G250 companies [have] report[ed] 
financial gains from their ESG activities, most often citing 
improvements in revenue and cost savings as the underlying 
factors. Perhaps the biggest indicator that investors care—and 
are one of the biggest drivers of the sustainability reporting 
movement—is that companies listed on stock exchanges are the 
most likely to report such data (as opposed to state- or 
foundation-controlled or privately-held or family-owned 
companies or co-operatives). Investors have spoken, experts and 
authorities have opined, and company actions have reflected that 
ESG data is material—to such an extent that it appears on 
Bloomberg screens. Reasonable investors consider it essential to 
the mix of information upon which they rely.101 
Therefore, sustainability data fits the definition of material 
information that must be published by issuers of securities, 
including cities.102 
V.  WHY SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IS GOOD 
POLICY FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS 
 Cities have become a focus of attention in discussions of 
sustainability because of two trends: the internationalization of 
cities and the localization of sustainable development.103  Legal 
theorists have largely embraced this as a positive development.104  
 
 101. Sulkowski & Waddock, supra note 19, at 1072–73 (footnotes omitted). 
 102. To state that security laws already require sustainability disclosures is 
not to suggest that more explicit or specific mandates would not be good public 
policy. See Sulkowski & Waddock, supra note 19, at 1084. 
 103. Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of 
Sustainable Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 596 (2009). 
 104. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local 
Government Law, 38 URB. L. 1, 1–4 (2006). See generally Yishai Blank, 
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Especially given the lack of progress at the national and 
international levels to advance policies that would curb global 
environmental problems, local governments have been recognized 
as both the level where political will can most effectively be 
channeled into constructive action and where solutions have been 
executed.105 
 Those cities that have adopted the use of indicators and 
reporting have reported greater success in meeting goals.106  
Other observed benefits include the engagement and activation of 
stakeholders, and learning which strategies work and why.107  
Reporting cities have also cited gains in terms of educating and 
inspiring citizens, helping diverse stakeholders speak using a 
common terminology, and coordinating actions in the same 
direction.108  The Boston Green Ribbon Commission, authors of 
Benchmarking Boston’s Sustainability Performance Management 
Systems, assert that reporting helps to stimulate constituent 
involvement in setting goals, implementing and coordinating 
actions, tracking progress, and aligning budgets with strategy.109  
Additionally, it can help in assigning individual evaluation 
metrics related to goals, the ability of systems to collect and 
analyze data, facilitating discussion of progress internally and 
externally, and furthering the cause of boosting accountability 
and recognition.110  Further, data from fifty-eight countries shows 
that mandating sustainability disclosures improves, among other 
things, governance and ethical conduct as well as reducing energy 
and water use and waste.111  In other words, the benefits of 
 
Comparative Visions of Global Public Order (Part 2): Localism in the New 
Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 263 (2006). 
 105. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Can You Hear Me Up There? Giving Voice to 
Local Communities Imperative for Achieving Sustainability, 4 ENVT’L & ENERGY 
L & POL’Y J. 256, 295 (2009). 
 106. JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 190. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory 
Corporate Sustainability Reporting 1, 11 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Research, Working 
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sustainability reporting are observed in contexts where the 
practice is legally required.112 
 If cities embraced measuring and publishing environmental 
impact data on a widespread basis, it could be a critical step 
toward curbing costly, needless, and destructive environmental 
side effects of how we conduct our daily affairs—including those 
that are contributing to climate change. This statement is 
supported by several facts and observations. First, a growing 
majority of the planet’s population of over seven billion people 
live in cities.113  People enjoy a greater degree of access to—and 
control over—local government in comparison to national 
government. Because the long-predicted impacts of climate 
change are being acutely felt in the world’s cities—especially in 
major coastal metropolises—there is greater impetus and political 
will in favor of immediate constructive change and adaptation in 
cities, as evidenced by PlaNYC.114  This has manifested itself in 
ambitious goals that have been set and significant tangible 
actions taken by cities.115  Building codes—which often are 
established locally—affect the efficiency (both financially and in 
terms of resource usage) of buildings, the operation of which is 
one of humanity’s biggest environmental effects. Many energy, 
water, sewage, waste, transportation, and other infrastructures 
are managed by municipalities or at other sub-national levels 
and, as public infrastructure functions are often outsourced, 
reporting can involve (and thereby put appropriate constructive 
pressure on) for-profit infrastructure service companies. In other 
words, cities can demand companies and other organizations 
start measuring, reporting, and reducing negative impacts. 
Finally, the international community already accepts the critical 
role of cities, with the schedule of UN Climate Summits and 
 
 112. Id. at 1. 
 113. See WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/ [http://perma.cc/ 
2WGR-TUMU]. 
 114. Former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s leadership in the 
preparation of PlaNYC, the development of the C40 coalition of cities, and in 
implementing sustainability reporting is one highly visible illustration of this. 
See PLANYC PROGRESS REPORT 2014, at 56, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
planyc2030/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_FINAL_Web.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/H6MX-VTZL]. 
 115. See, e.g., id. at 55. 
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related negotiations and forums now regularly including events 
highlighting actions at sub-national levels.116 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Sustainability reporting is already de rigueur among large 
companies and is now starting to be adopted by municipalities. 
This article has summarized this recent trend and explained why 
it is both part of an emerging legal obligation for cities and a 
pragmatic development in terms of public policy. The exemption 
of municipalities from U.S. securities laws has been eroding, and, 
given trends in investor expectations, city governance, and the 
exigencies of managing a city and its finances in changing 
environmental contexts, we should expect to see sustainability 
reporting become an expectation. Given the benefits of 
sustainability reporting—everything from boosting the efficiency 
of government to improving access to capital to reducing 
unnecessary negative environmental impacts—the movement of 
municipalities to engage in sustainability reporting should be 
embraced by anyone with an interest in improved governance. 
 
 
 116. Mayors on the Frontline of Battle Against Climate Change – UN, UN AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE (May 29, 2014), http://www.un.org/climatechange/blog/2014/ 
05/29/mayors-on-frontline-of-battle-against-climate-change-un/ 
[http://perma.cc/W69M-8FGF]; see, e.g., Warsaw Dialogue on Scaling-Up Local 
and Subnational Climate Action, CITY OF WARSAW (Jan. 23, 2014), 
https://www.um.warszawa.pl/en/articles/climate-change-conference-2013-
warsaw [http://perma.cc/2GN5-RCCW]. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/4
